Buildings JAVOR 50 / JAVOR 51 / JAVOR 52 Current status: Building JAVOR 50 – Bílina has been destroyed and looted Building JAVOR 51 – Borovno – Míšov / Nuclear Museum The entrances to the JAVOR 52 facility in Bělá pod Bezdězem were blocked off because the site is being used to house refugees. In 1964, the leadership of the Soviet Army (SA) requested the construction of secret storage facilities for special munitions —nuclear warheads—which would be stored there and, in the event of an attack from the west, ready for deployment to the mobile launchers of the Soviet Army and the Czechoslovak People’s Army, as well as to the bomber aircraft of both armies.The nuclear storage units reported directly to the General Staff in Moscow—the 12th Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which made decisions regarding the potential release of nuclear munitions. These facilities were completely outside the jurisdiction of both the Czechoslovak People’s Army (ČSLA) command and the Central Group of Soviet Forces (CGV). At that time, however, there were no nuclear warheads on the territory of our country, and the Czechoslovak Army was to receive them from the Soviet Army only in the event of an increased threat.The plan was drawn up for three completely identical complexes, which were secretly constructed between 1966 and 1968 by Czechoslovak companies as “Communication Cable Units” under the code names Javor 50 – Bílina, Javor 51 – Borovno – Míšov, and Javor 52 – Bělá pod Bezdězem. There were two such facilities in the GDR, three in Poland, and two each in Hungary and Bulgaria. The JAVOR facilities were transit storage sites, not warehouses! The difference between a warehouse and a temporary storage facility lies in their very purpose—specifically, the duration of material storage and the frequency of material receipt and issuance. A standard warehouse is used for the long-term storage of weapons, but a temporary storage facility is, simply put, a short-term location for storing weapons. In the early 1960s, the global situation changed rapidly, and so the USSR issued a new directive—or rather, a requirement—to build secret depots for special munitions: nuclear warheads.According to the operational plan from October 1964, the Czechoslovak Front was to carry out 131 nuclear strikes in the course of fulfilling its missions (of which 96 were to be carried out by ground forces’ missile systems and 35 by air force units). ! ! ! However, the turnaround time for delivering nuclear warheads was 18–22 hours, whereas the Czechoslovak People’s Army’s ground-based missile forces were supposed to be ready to conduct combat operations within 3 hours. Therefore, in December 1965, a Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement was signed regarding the construction of nuclear munitions storage facilities on our territory. In April 1966, as part of Operation “Javor,” construction began on special facilities in the areas of Bílina, Bělá pod Bezdězem, and Míšov–Borovno (Jince Military Training Area), which were to be managed by Soviet Army units disguised as signal units.! ! ! In December 1968, the Soviet Army was the first to take over the storage facility in Bělá pod Bezdězem, and the corresponding special unit took up its position in February of the following year. Only a senior representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States attached to the Ministry of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was authorized to inspect these depots. Representatives of the Czechoslovak People’s Army had no access to them. The point was that these were not supposed to be depots for the long-term storage of nuclear munitions.The Soviets were always extremely distrustful, even paranoid, toward everyone, and they did not trust us at that time either; so they followed a policy of entrusting the construction of classified facilities for the storage and assembly of nuclear munitionsto the Czechoslovak People’s Army’s construction units; however, as soon as construction was completed, the Soviets took over everything. The operation and maintenance of the facilities were under their control, and they did not allow anyone from outside to enter—it was like a small state within a state. In these storage facilities, the nuclear warheads were to be simply assembled and activated, after which they would be ready for delivery to the Czechoslovak People’s Army and the Soviet Missile Brigade. Description of the facilities: The core of the complex always consisted of two reinforced-concrete storage facilities below ground level, built on a 20-meter-deep concrete conical foundation. Each of these storage facilities had two opposite entrances, each with its own ramp, a roller conveyor system for transporting nuclear warhead containers, and a pair of armored gates that opened only during the loading and unloading of containers. Using cranes inside, the containers were lowered to the floor of the main hall, where the entrances to the four storage areas were located. The entrance for warehouse personnel was a camouflaged submarine hatch at the top of a camouflage embankment, where a tall forest stands today. Each concrete storage bunker had its own well with a water distribution system, a backup diesel-electric generator powered by a six-cylinder Škoda engine, filtration and complete air evacuation systems, as well as distribution systems for helium and compressed air, and waste disposal systems.The Míšov complex covers an area of 150 hectares and was divided internally into several security zones with different access regimes. Immediately beyond the gate is the “civilian” sector, which includes a former hospital, a store, a dog kennel, a guardhouse, a cultural hall, a waterworks, a boiler room, a playground, a school, a kindergarten, and apartment buildings that housed approximately 300 people, including 70 SA soldiers.The most heavily guarded zone, containing ammunition depots for nuclear warheads, was located in the rear. It was surrounded by two fences and patrolled continuously by guards with dogs. Access was restricted to warehouse personnel only. Even within the warehouse itself, there was a system of varying access permissions to different areas. Soviet troops left the facility in Míšov on July 4, 1990. ! ! ! NUCLEAR AMMUNITION/WARHEADS WERE NEVER STORED IN THESE FACILITIES (for the reasons described above in the text) , OR , IT HAS NEVER BEEN PROVEN—NOR HAS IT BEEN DISPROVEN—THAT THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE EVER PRESENT THERE! ! ! THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OR DOCUMENT THAT EXPLICITLY STATES THAT: YES, IN SUCH-AND-SUCH A YEAR,THESE WEAPONS WERE DELIVERED TO SUCH-AND-SUCH A FACILITY AND WERE REMOVED IN SUCH-AND-SUCH A YEAR, signed by the official responsible for this operation, etc. BUT NOTHING OF THE KIND EXISTS!!!

"Where did the Russians go?" ....they're in eastern Ukraine right now ;)