The former nuclear warhead storage facility known as Javor 52—the entrance has been sealed with concrete, but you can squeeze through a hole that was dug next to it. Inside, the bunker is in poor condition, but it still had a certain charm.
Buildings JAVOR 50 / JAVOR 51 / JAVOR 52
Current status:
Building JAVOR 50 – Bílina has been destroyed and looted
Building JAVOR 51 – Borovno – Míšov / Nuclear Museum
The entrances to the JAVOR 52 facility in Bělá pod Bezdězem were blocked off because the site is being used to house refugees.
In 1964, the leadership of the Soviet Army (SA) requested the construction of secret storage facilities for special ammunition —nuclear warheads—which would be stored there and, in the event of an attack from the west, ready for deployment to mobile launchers of the Soviet Army and the Czechoslovak People’s Army, as well as to the bomber aircraft of both armies.The nuclear storage units reported directly to the General Staff in Moscow—the 12th Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which decided on the potential release of nuclear munitions. These facilities were completely outside the jurisdiction of both the Czechoslovak People’s Army (ČSLA) command and the Central Group of Soviet Forces (CGV). At that time, however, there were no nuclear warheads on the territory of our country, and the Czechoslovak army was to receive them from the Soviet Army only in the event of an heightened threat.The plan was drawn up for three completely identical complexes, which were secretly constructed between 1966 and 1968 by Czechoslovak companies as “Communication Cable Units” under the code names Javor 50 – Bílina, Javor 51 – Borovno – Míšov, and Javor 52 – Bělá pod Bezdězem. There were two identical facilities in the GDR, three in Poland, and two each in Hungary and Bulgaria. The JAVOR facilities were intermediate storage sites, not warehouses!
The difference between a warehouse and a temporary storage facility lies in their very purpose—specifically, the duration of material storage and the frequency of material issuance and receipt. A standard warehouse is used for the long-term storage of weapons, while an intermediate storage facility is, simply put, a short-term location for storing weapons. In the early 1960s, the global situation changed rapidly, and so the USSR issued a new directive—or rather, a requirement—to build secret depots for special munitions: nuclear warheads.According to the operational plan from October 1964, the Czechoslovak Front was to carry out 131 nuclear strikes in the course of fulfilling its tasks (of which 96 were to be carried out by ground forces’ missile systems and 35 by air force units).
! ! ! However, the turnaround time for delivering nuclear warheads was 18–22 hours, while the Czechoslovak People’s Army’s ground-based missile forces were supposed to be ready to conduct combat operations within 3 hours. Therefore, in December 1965, a Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement was signed regarding the construction of nuclear munitions storage facilities on our territory. In April 1966, as part of Operation “Javor,” construction began on special facilities in the areas of Bílina, Bělá pod Bezdězem, and Míšov–Borovno (Jince Military Training Area), which were to be managed by Soviet Army units disguised as signal units.! ! !
In December 1968, the Soviet Army was the first to take over the storage facility in Bělá pod Bezdězem, and the corresponding special unit took up its position in February of the following year. Only a senior representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states at the Ministry of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was authorized to inspect these depots. Representatives of the Czechoslovak People’s Army (ČSLA) were denied access. The point was precisely that these were not supposed to be depots for the long-term storage of nuclear munitions.The Soviets were always extremely distrustful, even paranoid, toward everyone, and they didn’t trust us at that time either, so they stuck to their policy of entrusting the construction of classified facilities for the storage and assembly of nuclear munitionsto the Czechoslovak People’s Army’s construction units; however, as soon as construction was completed, the Soviets took over everything—the operation and maintenance of the facilities were under their control, and they did not allow anyone from outside to enter—it was like a small state within a state. In these storage facilities, the nuclear warheads were to be simply assembled and activated, after which they would be ready for delivery to the Czechoslovak People’s Army and the Soviet Missile Brigade.
Description of the facilities: At the heart of the complex were always two reinforced-concrete storage facilities located below ground level on a 20-meter-deep concrete conical foundation. Each of these storage facilities had two opposite entrances, each with its own ramp, a roller conveyor system for transporting nuclear warhead containers, and a pair of armored doors that opened only during the loading and unloading of containers. Using cranes inside, the containers were lowered to the floor of the main hall, where the entrances to the four storage areas were located. The entrance for warehouse personnel was a camouflaged submarine hatch at the top of a camouflage embankment, where a tall forest stands today.
Each concrete storage bunker had its own well with a water distribution system, a backup diesel-electric generator powered by a six-cylinder Škoda engine, filtration and complete air evacuation systems, as well as distribution systems for helium and compressed air, and waste disposal systems.The Míšov complex covers an area of 150 hectares and was divided internally into several security zones with different access protocols. Immediately beyond the gate is the “civilian” sector, which includes a former hospital, a store, a dog kennel, a guardhouse, a cultural hall, a waterworks, a boiler room, a playground, a school, a kindergarten, and apartment buildings that housed approximately 300 people, including 70 SA soldiers.The most heavily guarded zone, containing ammunition depots for nuclear warheads, was located in the rear. It was surrounded by two fences with continuous guard duty and dogs. Access was restricted to warehouse personnel only. Even within the warehouse itself, there was a system of varying access permissions for different areas of the facility. Soviet troops left the facility in Míšov on July 4, 1990.
! ! ! NUCLEAR AMMUNITION/WARHEADS WERE NEVER STORED IN THESE FACILITIES (for the reasons described above in the text) , OR , IT HAS NEVER BEEN PROVEN—NOR HAS IT BEEN DISPROVEN—THAT THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE EVER PRESENT THERE ! ! ! THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OR DOCUMENT THAT EXPLICITLY STATES THAT: YES, IN SUCH-AND-SUCH A YEAR,THESE WEAPONS WERE DELIVERED TO SUCH-AND-SUCH A FACILITY AND WERE REMOVED IN SUCH-AND-SUCH A YEAR, signed by the official responsible for this operation, etc. BUT NOTHING OF THE SORT EXISTS!!!
JAVOR 52, located a short distance from Bělá pod Bezdězem... just like JAVOR 50 and JAVOR 51, nuclear warheads or ammunition were never stored here...However, these shelters and facilities were built for the short-term storage of nuclear warheads and tactical nuclear charges (which, simply put, are weaker nuclear charges with a maximum yield of 50 kT) . In the event of a conflict between the WEST (NATO) and the EAST (the Warsaw Pact countries) and a threat of nuclear weapons use by the WEST, specific nuclear warheads—that is, warheads for missile launchers—would be immediately transported from storage facilities in the USSR and Polandspecific nuclear warheads—that is, warheads for missile launchers—would be transported from depots in the USSR and Poland to these three facilities: JAVOR 50, JAVOR 51, and JAVOR 52.At these facilities, personnel consisting exclusively of members of the Red Army inspected, maintained, and activated these warheads, then prepared them for mounting on missile launchers that were already in place on the premises.Afterward, these launchers—with the nuclear warheads already mounted and activated—were moved to launch sites built for this purpose in the surrounding area. But why were those warheads never actually there? Because the Soviets were known for their extreme distrust, so they would not have left something like a nuclear warhead stored somewhere for a long time, outside their direct control—and especially so close to the western borders with the WEST...They simply trusted only themselves and kept the warheads securely on their own territory. That is why these facilities were built for the SHORT-TERM STORAGE OF NUCLEAR AMMUNITION,simply for delivery, activation, and mounting onto missile launchers, which were then immediately transported to launch sites ready to fire these tactical missiles—which were not long-range, quite the contrary. Someone might object: why were these storage facilities built if the bombs weren’t actually kept there in the end? After all, if a conflict broke out, it would take some time for those warheads to be transported to the site and deployed, wouldn’t it? Well, that’s precisely the catch: in the event of a conflict, when it would be clear that the use of conventional weapons (tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry, paratroopers, rocket launchers, air force, helicopters by the WEST,during an attack on our borders by Warsaw Pact states—there would be no need to use nuclear weapons, even though this possibility is also mentioned in one plan, because those tactical nuclear weapons with low yield,were primarily intended to eliminate infantry, ground forces, armored vehicles, tanks, armored personnel carriers, or fortified positions...However, the moment military intelligence learned that the WEST was preparing to use Pershing missiles—which were deployed near our borders and could carry nuclear warheads—only then would the EAST respond by activating tactical nuclear weapons and delivering these warheads to facilities such as JAVOR, etc.—this would pertain to a tactical attack and the use of tactical nuclear weapons...Simply put, from a military standpoint, there are processes in place that would allow them to somehow learn in advance of the planned use of Western tactical nuclear weapons, and they would respond accordingly.But in the event of a global conflict, when ICBMs—that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, but with a much larger yield (megatons)—are launched without warning by one side or the other,the response to these would again consist solely of launching identical missiles—but these would be the kind designed to obliterate cities, entire territories of nations, the population, and all vegetation…However, radars built in various locations around the world are responsible for detecting this type of attack. But that is a different matter altogether, one that has nothing to do with the JAVOR facilities...
Comments
Buildings JAVOR 50 / JAVOR 51 / JAVOR 52 Current status: Building JAVOR 50 – Bílina has been destroyed and looted Building JAVOR 51 – Borovno – Míšov / Nuclear Museum The entrances to the JAVOR 52 facility in Bělá pod Bezdězem were blocked off because the site is being used to house refugees. In 1964, the leadership of the Soviet Army (SA) requested the construction of secret storage facilities for special ammunition —nuclear warheads—which would be stored there and, in the event of an attack from the west, ready for deployment to mobile launchers of the Soviet Army and the Czechoslovak People’s Army, as well as to the bomber aircraft of both armies.The nuclear storage units reported directly to the General Staff in Moscow—the 12th Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which decided on the potential release of nuclear munitions. These facilities were completely outside the jurisdiction of both the Czechoslovak People’s Army (ČSLA) command and the Central Group of Soviet Forces (CGV). At that time, however, there were no nuclear warheads on the territory of our country, and the Czechoslovak army was to receive them from the Soviet Army only in the event of an heightened threat.The plan was drawn up for three completely identical complexes, which were secretly constructed between 1966 and 1968 by Czechoslovak companies as “Communication Cable Units” under the code names Javor 50 – Bílina, Javor 51 – Borovno – Míšov, and Javor 52 – Bělá pod Bezdězem. There were two identical facilities in the GDR, three in Poland, and two each in Hungary and Bulgaria. The JAVOR facilities were intermediate storage sites, not warehouses! The difference between a warehouse and a temporary storage facility lies in their very purpose—specifically, the duration of material storage and the frequency of material issuance and receipt. A standard warehouse is used for the long-term storage of weapons, while an intermediate storage facility is, simply put, a short-term location for storing weapons. In the early 1960s, the global situation changed rapidly, and so the USSR issued a new directive—or rather, a requirement—to build secret depots for special munitions: nuclear warheads.According to the operational plan from October 1964, the Czechoslovak Front was to carry out 131 nuclear strikes in the course of fulfilling its tasks (of which 96 were to be carried out by ground forces’ missile systems and 35 by air force units). ! ! ! However, the turnaround time for delivering nuclear warheads was 18–22 hours, while the Czechoslovak People’s Army’s ground-based missile forces were supposed to be ready to conduct combat operations within 3 hours. Therefore, in December 1965, a Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement was signed regarding the construction of nuclear munitions storage facilities on our territory. In April 1966, as part of Operation “Javor,” construction began on special facilities in the areas of Bílina, Bělá pod Bezdězem, and Míšov–Borovno (Jince Military Training Area), which were to be managed by Soviet Army units disguised as signal units.! ! ! In December 1968, the Soviet Army was the first to take over the storage facility in Bělá pod Bezdězem, and the corresponding special unit took up its position in February of the following year. Only a senior representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states at the Ministry of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was authorized to inspect these depots. Representatives of the Czechoslovak People’s Army (ČSLA) were denied access. The point was precisely that these were not supposed to be depots for the long-term storage of nuclear munitions.The Soviets were always extremely distrustful, even paranoid, toward everyone, and they didn’t trust us at that time either, so they stuck to their policy of entrusting the construction of classified facilities for the storage and assembly of nuclear munitionsto the Czechoslovak People’s Army’s construction units; however, as soon as construction was completed, the Soviets took over everything—the operation and maintenance of the facilities were under their control, and they did not allow anyone from outside to enter—it was like a small state within a state. In these storage facilities, the nuclear warheads were to be simply assembled and activated, after which they would be ready for delivery to the Czechoslovak People’s Army and the Soviet Missile Brigade. Description of the facilities: At the heart of the complex were always two reinforced-concrete storage facilities located below ground level on a 20-meter-deep concrete conical foundation. Each of these storage facilities had two opposite entrances, each with its own ramp, a roller conveyor system for transporting nuclear warhead containers, and a pair of armored doors that opened only during the loading and unloading of containers. Using cranes inside, the containers were lowered to the floor of the main hall, where the entrances to the four storage areas were located. The entrance for warehouse personnel was a camouflaged submarine hatch at the top of a camouflage embankment, where a tall forest stands today. Each concrete storage bunker had its own well with a water distribution system, a backup diesel-electric generator powered by a six-cylinder Škoda engine, filtration and complete air evacuation systems, as well as distribution systems for helium and compressed air, and waste disposal systems.The Míšov complex covers an area of 150 hectares and was divided internally into several security zones with different access protocols. Immediately beyond the gate is the “civilian” sector, which includes a former hospital, a store, a dog kennel, a guardhouse, a cultural hall, a waterworks, a boiler room, a playground, a school, a kindergarten, and apartment buildings that housed approximately 300 people, including 70 SA soldiers.The most heavily guarded zone, containing ammunition depots for nuclear warheads, was located in the rear. It was surrounded by two fences with continuous guard duty and dogs. Access was restricted to warehouse personnel only. Even within the warehouse itself, there was a system of varying access permissions for different areas of the facility. Soviet troops left the facility in Míšov on July 4, 1990. ! ! ! NUCLEAR AMMUNITION/WARHEADS WERE NEVER STORED IN THESE FACILITIES (for the reasons described above in the text) , OR , IT HAS NEVER BEEN PROVEN—NOR HAS IT BEEN DISPROVEN—THAT THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE EVER PRESENT THERE ! ! ! THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OR DOCUMENT THAT EXPLICITLY STATES THAT: YES, IN SUCH-AND-SUCH A YEAR,THESE WEAPONS WERE DELIVERED TO SUCH-AND-SUCH A FACILITY AND WERE REMOVED IN SUCH-AND-SUCH A YEAR, signed by the official responsible for this operation, etc. BUT NOTHING OF THE SORT EXISTS!!!
JAVOR 52, located a short distance from Bělá pod Bezdězem... just like JAVOR 50 and JAVOR 51, nuclear warheads or ammunition were never stored here...However, these shelters and facilities were built for the short-term storage of nuclear warheads and tactical nuclear charges (which, simply put, are weaker nuclear charges with a maximum yield of 50 kT) . In the event of a conflict between the WEST (NATO) and the EAST (the Warsaw Pact countries) and a threat of nuclear weapons use by the WEST, specific nuclear warheads—that is, warheads for missile launchers—would be immediately transported from storage facilities in the USSR and Polandspecific nuclear warheads—that is, warheads for missile launchers—would be transported from depots in the USSR and Poland to these three facilities: JAVOR 50, JAVOR 51, and JAVOR 52.At these facilities, personnel consisting exclusively of members of the Red Army inspected, maintained, and activated these warheads, then prepared them for mounting on missile launchers that were already in place on the premises.Afterward, these launchers—with the nuclear warheads already mounted and activated—were moved to launch sites built for this purpose in the surrounding area. But why were those warheads never actually there? Because the Soviets were known for their extreme distrust, so they would not have left something like a nuclear warhead stored somewhere for a long time, outside their direct control—and especially so close to the western borders with the WEST...They simply trusted only themselves and kept the warheads securely on their own territory. That is why these facilities were built for the SHORT-TERM STORAGE OF NUCLEAR AMMUNITION,simply for delivery, activation, and mounting onto missile launchers, which were then immediately transported to launch sites ready to fire these tactical missiles—which were not long-range, quite the contrary. Someone might object: why were these storage facilities built if the bombs weren’t actually kept there in the end? After all, if a conflict broke out, it would take some time for those warheads to be transported to the site and deployed, wouldn’t it? Well, that’s precisely the catch: in the event of a conflict, when it would be clear that the use of conventional weapons (tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry, paratroopers, rocket launchers, air force, helicopters by the WEST,during an attack on our borders by Warsaw Pact states—there would be no need to use nuclear weapons, even though this possibility is also mentioned in one plan, because those tactical nuclear weapons with low yield,were primarily intended to eliminate infantry, ground forces, armored vehicles, tanks, armored personnel carriers, or fortified positions...However, the moment military intelligence learned that the WEST was preparing to use Pershing missiles—which were deployed near our borders and could carry nuclear warheads—only then would the EAST respond by activating tactical nuclear weapons and delivering these warheads to facilities such as JAVOR, etc.—this would pertain to a tactical attack and the use of tactical nuclear weapons...Simply put, from a military standpoint, there are processes in place that would allow them to somehow learn in advance of the planned use of Western tactical nuclear weapons, and they would respond accordingly.But in the event of a global conflict, when ICBMs—that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, but with a much larger yield (megatons)—are launched without warning by one side or the other,the response to these would again consist solely of launching identical missiles—but these would be the kind designed to obliterate cities, entire territories of nations, the population, and all vegetation…However, radars built in various locations around the world are responsible for detecting this type of attack. But that is a different matter altogether, one that has nothing to do with the JAVOR facilities...